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ABSTRACT
Though the magnitude of the presented Christian military ventures in the Croatian-
Venetian perimeter should not be overrated, it is worth noting that the attacks against Novi 
Grad and Kostajnica took place during the sieges of Szigetvár and Gyula, which must have 
been a serious disruption to the Ottoman military command; Ákos Csányi’s letter dated 
August 31 states that 4000 cavalrymen from the camp besieging Szigetvár were recalled to 
Constantinople. This information is most probably false, the unit in question actually being 
the Turkish rescue army that arrived at the Sava to aid against the assault of the Hungarian 
troops. Apart from the numbers and the Bosnians’ involvement, the timelines also match. It 
suggests that archduke Charles not only led a successful campaign in the Turkish border-
lands in Bosnia, but they also managed to divert major forces from the siege of Szigetvár. It 
is not their fault, however, that despite long-nurtured plans, neither Maximillian’s troops in 
Győr, nor the other unit in Komárom followed suit and they never launched counterattacks 
against Esztergom, Visegrád or Székesfehérvár. The tactics that had been successfully 
employed during 1555-56, namely disrupting a Turkish campaign by attack on a stronghold 
or by nearby mobilization, was abandoned everywhere in 1566, except in the Croatian 
borderlands.
Key words: Bosnian campaign, Miklós Zrínyi, Péter Erdődy, archduke Charles, Herward Freiherr 
von Auersperg, Joseph Freiherr von Thurn, Ferenc Frangepán, Kostajnica, Novi Grad
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Due to the anniversary, the main events of 1566, the fall of Szigetvár and Gyula have been much 
discussed nowadays. However, the same year also witnessed events that are studied less or are virtually 
unknown. The present paper addresses one of these, an imperial-royal counterattack in the Croatian and 
Bosnian lands.
On May 1 1566, the 72-year-old Suleiman launched his seventh and last campaign in the Kingdom 
of Hungary. Similarly to the events of 1552, this war was also fought for Transylvania, even if outside 
Transylvania. The Habsbug court was intent on claiming the Szapolyai lands from János Zsigmond’s 
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control. At the Augsburg imperial diet in December 1565, the emperor called to the nobility for support, 
who decided to set up a major force of 40 000 footmen and 8000 riders. Parallel to the Augsburg sessi-
ons, archduke Charles was ordered to summon the Hungarian nobles in Pozsony.1 Needless to say, the 
Porte was soon aware of the emperor’s intentions as well. The sultan was unwilling to lose control over 
Transylvania by any means, thus at the turn of 1565-1566 he commanded the organization of a new 
campaign. The development was soon evident to the Habsburg Monarchy as well.2 Ákos Csányi, high 
prefect of the Nádasdy estates wrote the following in January 1566: »I can certainly inform your high-
ness that news about the Turkish Emperor’s arrival has reached our castles. I have seen a letter from 
Babócsa as well, which show clearly that they are terrified of the news. I have told nobody else, but 
some four or more months ago I heard this from a Turk. God be my witness I thought before, that after 
claming the lands and keeping our emperor under threats through diplomacy, and even taking tax from 
them, after all these years he would commit himself to raise armies with his wealth; this and more things 
are to come, and even risking dying in the campaign, his name is enemy. Indeed my lady, it is clearly 
spoken that he is arriving, and if it is not talked about in order not to upset our emperor, still, boatma-
king along the Danube, collection of food, and counting the population of the lands could be started 
soon. Yesterday a prisoner of Ambrus Pálfy came from Buda, who was subjected to agha Piri. He spent 
three weeks in Buda at the pasha, he claims it for certain that the emperor is indeed arriving in time, 
but even before that the beglerbey is moving to Sziget, then to send up troops to king János’s son and 
to hold the Danube with the main army, but my lady if our good Lord wills it so, none of this comes to 
aught.«3
The preparations of the sultan were known in Vienna by the end of January or early February, as 
archduke Ferdinand’s letter from February 21, 1566 gives evidence. On the 9th of the same month, the 
archduke in Prague was informed by Holy Roman emperor and Hungarian king Maximillian II about 
the news from Albert Wyss, a Habsburg diplomat sent to Istanbul. According to these, the Porte was 
preparing for war on land and on water. The emperor asked his brother for advice on how to react in the 
situation: peace negotiations were underway between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy, 
with the latter intending to exclude János Zsigmond from the process.4 An active correspondence 
started between the brothers, as the emperor sent first a Latin letter on February 23 and a German one 
two days later, inquiring about advice on preparing for the war. Archduke Ferdinand replied on February 
29, which letter reveals that the Court Military Council and the emperor were concerned about potential 
attack on three castles: Szigetvár, Eger and Gyula. They planned to fortify these and to deploy additional 
troops. In his response the archduke also suggested that in case Miklós Zrínyi or László Kerecsényi 
resigned from their offices, the emperor should appoint a new, competent person to lead the local 
troops.5
It is a less known fact that the Court Military Council had a complete campaign plan as early as April 
1566. István Földvári, one of Zrínyi’s servitors wrote to Ákos Csányi on April 28, 1566 from Alsólen-
dva: »his majesty the emperor wrote to duke Charles from Augusta (today Augsburg, Germany) and 
ordered to provide rations for two hundred people. According to his majesty’s intentions, the prince 
shall have a significant army and he himself shall wage war, hurrying from Augusta. His majesty will 
be at Vienna with his camp, and ordered Ferdinand to move to Nagyszombat (today Trnava, Slovakia) 
or Sempte (today Šintava, Slovakia), along with his Czech and Moravian troops. He gave orders to duke 




























































R and Kranjola (today Slovenia). The good troops with whom his majesty the emperor shall travel in 
person shall be led by the duke of Saxona (Ágost Saxon prince-elector) as Obrist Feldhauptmann and 
Count Kinter Schwarzenberg as marshall.«6
As the letter shows, archduke Charles had the role of uniting the Styrian, Carinthian, Krajnian, Cro-
atian and Slavonian armies at Ptuj. Some of these troops was not condemned for waiting, they also 
launched raids into the lands under Ottoman occupation, as related in Farkas Giczy’s7 letter to Orsolya 
Kanizsai dated September 4, 1566 from Sjeničak Lasinjski (today Sjeničak Lasinjski, Croatia),8 or as 
discussed in the military report of the Court Military Council at the end of the year.9 Let us recount 
what took place in the Croatian-Venetian borderlands. The archduke, who had been still in Vienna in 
July 1566, moved out to the appointed armies. As an overture for the campaign preparations, on the 
night before August 10, a Turkish army of 800 infantrymen and 300 riders attacked Topusko (today 
Croatia). The old outer stockades were breached easily, and because most stationed soldiers were at the 
moment away, the attackers captured 203 prisoners, 300 animals and 20 horses. Farkas Giczy, the pre-
fect at Sjeničak Lasinjski, gave the following witness account in his letter to Ákos Csányi: »The Turks 
came to Topusko the previous month, the night before the last Saturday prior to Our Lady’s day. I was 
present at the castle and the Turks who arrived were 800 footmen and 300 riders strong, and as the 
outer stockade walls were indeed old, they had easy entry; the positioned soldiers were not on duty, but 
each away at their homes. As the castle folk had no sentries, two hundred and three were taken captive, 
together with children, girls and women, three hundred cattle and even more than twenty horses were 
stolen.«10
Péter Erdődy, ban of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalamtia was ordered by the emperor to call an assembly. 
The letter of king Maximillian was read out to the Croatian-Slavonian noblemen in Zagreb, informing 
them that duke Charles, the emperor’s brother, was arriving to defend Croatia with a great army, and 
the lands along the river Una would be freed from Turkish rule. Archduke Charles was in Graz at the 
time and sent an order to the same assembly that the ban and the nobility should take care of the provi-
sions for the arriving army on the one hand, and prepare for warfare themselves on the other hand. 
Erdődy and all other officials in the borderlands were ordered to launch attacks into the occupied lands, 
until Charles arrived to take over the command.11 The nobility organized the responsibilities of provi-
sions and enlistment, marking Sjeničak Lasinjski, south-east from Zagreb, as the camp for the Croatian 
armies that gathered south of the Sava and Kupa rivers. After much persuasion on the ban’s and the 
Zagreb bishop’s part, Farkas Giczy took the office of lieutenant in the nobility’s forces. He was also 
responsible for appointing units from the Croatian army in case the defense of the Perner, Hrezna, 
Topusko and Bović strongholds becomes necessary.
The leaders who were already at camp, Herward Freiherr von Auersperg, Oberstleutnant of Croatian 
border,12 the ban Péter Erdődy, the Hauptmann of the Krajnian nobles, Joseph Freiherr von Thurn and 
other officials, held a war council and decided that Novi Grad (today Bosnia-Herzegovina) must be 












12	 Pálffy	 Géza:	 Kerületi	 és	 végvidéki	 főkapitányok	 és	 főkapitány-helyettesek	 Magyarországon	 a	 16–17.	
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psychological arguments. The castle at the bank of the Una was owned by Miklós Zrínyi, like the other 
riverside stronghold, Bosanska Kupa (today Bosnia-Herzegovina). In late June of 1565, both was cap-
tured by Bosnian bey Sokollu Mustafa, a nephew of grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed. The defenders were 
all slain.14
In accordance with the Court Military Council’s decree, 3000 Hungarian, Croatian and German 
cavalry and 800 infantrymen were combined on August 24 at Topusko, 30 km south-east off Sjeničak 
Lasinjski. They marched to the Una, with the infantry carrying orders to charge the Novi Grad castle. 
Part of the cavalry was sent to the castle of Kostajnica (today Bosnia-Herzegovina) with Giczy and 
Ferenc Fragepán as lieutenants, which place had been captured by the Ottomans long ago; this enabled 
the Christians to raid and plunder the lands up to the Sava river and they could block a potential Turkish 
counterattack.15 According to Giczy, the Vlach-populated region was pillaged, with more than 300 
prisoners taken.16 Beside this, they went to ambush the guards of Kostajnica as well. The plan involved 
the Croatian light cavalry as bait, which was to lure the enemy riders from the castle. The German and 
Hungarian light cavalry units were standing by at their hiding place and had to ambush the deceived 
pursuers. The Turks in the Kostajnica garrison did make the sortie out, trusting that backup would arrive 
from the neighboring strongholds. They got trapped soon, though, and lost many: some were taken 
captive and others cut down. However, many of them made it back to the castle.17 After their glorious 
victory, Giczy and Frangepán returned with the troops and their 300 captives to the siege camp under 
Novi Grad.
Giczy’s account relates the following: »From where we were descending to the castle, there were 
outcries from behind, and the calls came also from other directions, »Turks! Turks!« Bey Hlewnay 
Husrem were camped between Krupa and Novi Grad and heard the shots; thus he saddled up and rode 
out with some entourage toward the shot; my lord Zlúny (Ferenc Frangepán) were not with the Ger-
mans at that time and thus my lord Zlúnyi hit them. Even though the bey had the better numbers than 
my lord Zlúny. But the bey fell from his mount and was captured by the Germans. No one has been 
allowed to speak with him, except the Ban and my lord Asperger. One reason for not allowing talk is 
that the prisoner is severely wounded. The barber who tends to his wounds says talking is hard for his 
head yet.«18 Giczy relates that Ferenc Frangepán left the camp with a small squad and attacked bey 
Husrem and his entourage, who had separated from the Turkish army gathering between Krupa and 
Novi Grad. They took the wounded bey with them as prisoner. During interrogation, the captives told 
differing alternatives about the purpose of bey Husrem and his troops coming from the Krupa castle: 
»…these could not equivocally tell why the bey had mobilized; some claim there were news about my 
lord the ban intending to take Podravska Moslavina and they went to aid that; others state they bey 
wanted to march to Bović with the purpose of raiding it; yet others do not know whether any of these 
were causes for him to arrive.«19
Meanwhile, the Christian infantry took and burned the town under Novi Grad. The ban and Auer-
sperg were discussing attacking the upper castle when they received word that the Bosnian pasha who 
had been busy at the siege of Szigetvár, came to the Sava with a 4000-strong army to lift the siege.20 
Therefore Erdődy and Auersperg changed their minds and went against these, ambushing the enemy off 
Novi Grad. The Turks were badly defeated in the battle, with many Bosnian officers and soldiers fallen. 




























































Burdened with a large amount of pillaged goods, Erdődy’s and Auersperg’s armies withdrew to the 
Glina river, where the seriously injured bey Husrem was interrogated. His confession is known via 
Giczy’s account: »as to the emperor’s army, he knows this: they shall not leave Sziget before winning 
it. From there the emperor shall move to Eger and proceed to capture that. He also said that there was 
news about Gyula taken, but even if Gyula was not captured, the emperor is to march to Gyula after 
Eger and he shall take that castle as well. There he shall divide the army and move to Buda for the 
winter; he does not know about the emperor’s plans for the coming spring.«22
According to the year-closing military report of the Court Military Council, there were skirmishes 
in the Croatian-Venetian borderlands even after the events in late August. A part of archduke Charles’ 
troops attacked Pozsega, burned up the place and plundered most of the surrounding land. In late Sep-
tember, the ban’s units were prowling and raiding up as far as Velike.23
Though the magnitude of the presented Christian military ventures in the Croatian-Venetian perime-
ter should not be overrated, it is worth noting that the attacks against Novi Grad and Kostajnica took 
place during the sieges of Szigetvár and Gyula, which must have been a serious disruption to the Otto-
man military command; Ákos Csányi’s letter dated August 31 states that 4000 cavalrymen from the 
camp besieging Szigetvár were recalled to Constantinople.24 This information is most probably false, 
the unit in question actually being the Turkish rescue army that arrived at the Sava to aid against the 
assault of the Hungarian troops. Apart from the numbers and the Bosnians’ involvement, the timelines 
also match. It suggests that archduke Charles not only led a successful campaign in the Turkish border-
lands in Bosnia, but they also managed to divert major forces from the siege of Szigetvár. It is not their 
fault, however, that despite long-nurtured plans, neither Maximillian’s troops in Győr, nor the other unit 
in Komárom followed suit and they never launched counterattacks against Esztergom, Visegrád or 
Székesfehérvár. The tactics that had been successfully employed during 1555-56, namely disrupting a 
Turkish campaign by attack on a stronghold or by nearby mobilization, was abandoned everywhere in 




Fig 1. The progress of 
the campaign. Hungarian 
mobilizations in red, Turkish 
mobilizations in green.
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István Földvári for Ákos Csányi, Lendava, 28 April 1566
Szolgálatom ajánlása után, bizodalmas uram, az én régi és szolgált kegyelmes uram. Zrínyi uram 
kivel tegnap voltam szemben, és elég bőven beszédes, mind ebéd előtt, s mind ebéd után, jelenté, hogy 
holnapi napon akar indulni Csáktornyáról, Csorgóra. Panaszkodék eléggé, hogy kevés kísérő népet 
adott az fejedelem melléje, nem többet, száz lovag fegyveresnél, és két száz huszárnál. Mert ha ő felsége 
oly módon való népet adott volna melléje, kivel valamit kísértetné meg, minden szándéka ez volt, hogy 
ez mostani útjában valamire elég lehetett volna, mindent meg akart volna kísérteni, kiről ő fölségét egy 
néhány levelében meg találta és szorgalmaztatta. Jelenté fő Commissarius úr lészen vele, Ansperger 
uram az hadakozó tanács. Továbbá ez híreket jelenté ő nagysága, hogy császár ő fölsége írt volna Káro-
ly hercegnek Augustából, és azt parancsolta, hogy kétszáz ezer emberre való élést szerezzenek. Az ő 
nagysága mostani értelme szerint lészen az fejedelemnek ugyan bizonyában való hada, és személy 
szerint hadban lészen, ki immár nem késik Augustából alá jönni. Ő maga derék táborával Bécsnél lés-
zen, Ferdinánd herceget, csehországi és morvai hadával Nagyszombatnál, avagy Sempténél végezte 
lenni. Károly herceget pedig Stájer, korontáli és Kranjolabeli hadával Potolynál végezte lenni. Az derék 
hadnak, kiben császár ő fölsége személye szerint lészen, főhadnagya az saxonai herceg és marsallja gróf 
Kinter svarczenburgi lészen. Jelente ezt is ő nagysága, hogy az hadba való készületet erősen meg paran-
csolta császár őfölsége minden országiban, de ezen csodálkozik, hogy ő fölsége magyar országbelie-
knek erről nem parancsol. Ezeket akarám meg írnom kegyelmednek a kegyelmed parancsolatyára, és 
ez levélnek elküldését bíztam Kun Mátyás uramra, az Bánfy István uram udvarbírájára, mert az Sze-
menye révre nem lén visszatérésem. Ajánlom kegyelmednek örök szolgálatomat. Az Úr isten tarcsa 
kegyelmed mindenkoron jó egészségben. Alsólendváról vasárnap, Szentgyörgy nap után, 1566.
Kegyelmed szolgája, Földvári István
Hosszútóti György egy pénzt sem vitt, hiszem hogy jól érti kegyelmed.
Farkas Giczy for Orsolya Kanizsai, Castle of Sjeničak Lasinjski, 4 September1566
Tekéntetes és nagyságos, kegyelmes asszonyom, éltemig való szolgálatomat nagyságodnak, mint 
kegyelmes asszonyomnak. Innénd, ez földnek állapatyáról nagyságodnak egyéb hírt nem írhatok, 
hanem Bán uram és Aspergár uram az töb német urakkal és Zluny, Tersachyky és Blagay uraimmal 
mentenek vala az Ón víze felé, Újvár alá. Énis innénd az nagyságod szolgáival, mind lovaggal, gyalog-
gal el mentem vala. Az Ón vízén által mentönk vala és Újvárnak az városát mind el égették, az vár felé. 
Ki házak voltanak agáké, vajdáké, azokat mind el égeték, jóllehet, hogy Aspergár uram Bán urammal 
azt végezték volna, hogy az kik az száguldásba az rablóban lesznek, azokat Zlúny urammal mi őrízék, 
hogy ha Kosztanyicáról török  jüne, de Zlúny uram éjel el szakadot vala tűlem, hanem szolgái voltanak 
velem. Az oláhokat bizony választig rablójok, és égetnyék, hogy az egész had háromszáz rabnál töbet 
hoztönk, hogy mi az rablóból meg tevénk úgy érkezénk Újvár alá, hogy immár az váras éget. Az 
honnand mi az vár alá ereszkedönk vala alá, háttúl meg sialkodának, más felőlis mondák, hogy török, 
török. Az Hlewnay Huszrem bég hált volt azon éjel Krupa közöt, és Újvár közöt, hogy az lővést hallotta, 
úgy ült volt fel egy paripájára egynéhán magával, az lővésre megyen volt, Zlúny uram akkor nem néme-
tekkel volt, és reá ütöt Zlúny uram. Jóllehet, hogy mikor az bégre reá ütötenek, az bég töbed magával 
volt, hogy sem Zlúny uram. De az paripa az békkel el eset, és az németek fogták meg az béget. Még 
senkit nem hadtak vele beszélleni, hanem Bán uram és Asperger uram beszéllet vele. Ez okáért sem 
hagynak vele beszélleni, hogy fölötte igen sebes. Az barbély az ki kötözi, azt mongya, hogy nehéz az 
fejének, ha beszélnek vele. Hogy Újvár alól meg térénk az Glyna vizén innénd vagyon egy víz, Csje-
mernicának híják, Bán uram és Aspergár uram szállottanak volt meg ot az víz mellet. Aspergár uram 
Bán uramat hítta volt hozzá és mentenek volt az béghez, hírt kérdeztenek tűle. Bán uram nekem mondá, 
hogy azt monta az bég, hogy ne báncsjatok mast, mert hogy szólók nehéz az fejemnek, ingyen csjászár 
hada felől ezt tuggya, hogy Szigetet el nem haggya, míg meg nem veszi. Onnand osztán Eger alá 
megyen, aztis meg veszi. Eztis monta, hogy hírön az, hogy Gyulát meg vették, de ha meg nem vettékis, 
Eger alól Gyula alá megyen, aztis meg veszi. Onnand osztán népet el osztya, és űmaga Budára megyen 
ót telel, kikeletre való szándékát nem tuggya. Eszt ez dolgot, ez előttis nagyságod tudására adtam volna, 


















































R de miúta az útról meg jütönk, minden éjel vagyon az sok lővés, vártam ha mi más hírem jünne, hogy 
nagyságodnak meg írnám. Azért ím ez jövendő vasárnapra hadta Bán uram, hogy minden ember az 
nyereséget Metlikére vigye. Bán uram monta vala nekem, hogy, ha az bég töb híreket beszéll, hogy 
nekem meg mongya, ha mi hírt értek, nagyságodnak meg írom. Nagyságodnak könyörgönk mind-
nyájan, kik it nagyságod szolgái vagyonk, hogy te nagyságod ezből az nyereségből az harmadát enged-
néje meg nagyságod, mert károsok sokan vagyonk, kinek lova sebes, kinek lova veszet oda. Nekemis 
oly lovam veszet oda, hogy látya isten nem adtam volna száz arany forinton. Mind lovaggal, gyaloggal 
töben voltonk oda innend nagyságod szolgái két száznál, az nyereség penig két oláh aszony ember, két 
oláh leányocsjka, horám oláh, egy török. Nagyságodnak könyörgönk, mint kegyelmes asszonyonknak, 
hogy nagyságod ezből lenne kegyelmes, ezk az foglyok sem tuggyák egy arány mondani, miért gyüle-
kezet volt egybe az bég, hanem ki mongya, hogy híre volt, hogy Monoszlót akarja Bán uram meg 
szállani, annak sgétségére, ki mongya hogy Bowychra akart az bég jüni, hogy azt égesse meg, ki mon-
gya, hogy nem tuggyák, ha mind ezekért vagy Magyar országra, az csjászár hadához kellet volna 
mennie. Az tenger mellé el bocsjáttám emberemet, ha nagyságodnak új tengeri újságot hoz, nagyságo-
hoz ki küldöm. Nagyságodnak eztis adhatom tudtára, hogy az fű takaráson mast vagyonk az kölesta-
karáson, mert it fű elet az köles, búza it igen kevés lén ez idén. Az it való dologról nagyságodnak ezt 
írhatom, hogy az vár előt, mely hegy vagyon, kit palánkal csináltanak volt, az igen ó vala, és mast azt 
bontatom, és újonnand csináltatom. Nagyságodtól kegyelmes választ váronk mindnyájan, kik it az 
nagyságod szolgái vagyonk. Az Úristen tarcsja meg nagyságodat minden javaival, nagy sok jó eszten-
dőkig, mind az nagyságod egyetlen fiával az én kegyelemes urammal egyetemben. Datum ex castro 
Sztenyicsjnyák, 4 die 7’bris. 1566.
Te nagyságodnak szolgája, Giczy Farkas
SAŽETAK
Iako ne bi trebalo precijeniti značaj zabilježenih Kršćanskih vojnih pohoda u sklopu hrvatsko-mle-
tačkih ratova, vrijedi spomenuti da su se napadi na Novi Grad i Kostajnicu zbili za vrijeme opsade 
Sigeta i Gyule, te da su vjerojatno uzrokovali značajnu pomutnju u vojnom zapovjedništvu Osmanlij-
skog carstva; Pismo koje je Ákos Csányi napisao 31. kolovoza navodi da je 4000 pripadnika konjice 
koja je Siget držala pod opsadom bilo pozvano u Konstantinopolis. Ova je informacija vrlo vjerojatno 
netočna, jedinica u pitanju je zapravo turska obrambena vojska koja je stigla do Save da pomogne pri-
likom napada mađarskih snaga. Osim samih brojki i uključenosti Bosne postoji i podudarnost na vre-
menskoj crti. Može se naslutiti da je nadvojvoda Charles ne samo vodio uspješnu bitku na granicama 
Osmanlijskog carstva u Bosni, već je uspio i preusmjeriti glavne snage od opsade Sigeta. Nije njihova 
greška što, usprkos pomnom i dugotrajnom planiranju, niti Maksimilijanova vojska u Győur, niti ostale 
jedinice u Komáromu nisu slijedile naredbe i nikada nisu izvršile protunapad na Esztergom, Visegrád 
ili Székesfehérvár. Taktika koja je uspješno korištena 1555.-1956., a svodila se na uzrokovanje pomut-
nje Osmanlijske vojske napadima na tvrđave ili pak putem mobilizacije, prestala se 1566. koristiti 
svugdje osim u graničnim područjima s Hrvatskom. 
